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Introduction 
 
For many orthodox economists, the never-ending Euro crisis that began in late 2007 confirmed 
the wisdom of their long-standing crusade to transform the rules governing Southern European 
labor markets. These arguments were embraced by the Troika formed by the European 
Commission, the IMF and the European Central Bank, which declared poorly designed labor 
market institutions to be among the most serious ailments afflicting Greece, Italy, Portugal and 
Spain. The reluctance of political elites in these countries to challenge claims that the crisis was a 
product of domestic institutional shortcomings and their unwillingness to consider Euro exit thus 
pushed institutional reform to the top of the domestic political agenda. 
 
Whether domestic institutions were really to blame for the crisis or not, the Troika’s recipe for 
reform was presented by international and domestic elites alike as the only way to avoid 
sovereign default. The crisis had delivered—or so it appeared—an exogenous shock of sufficient 
magnitude to force a radical reform of domestic institutions long impervious to external pleas for 
change. Eight years into the crisis, major labor market reforms have indeed been pursued in 
Greece, Portugal and Spain, and Italy finally looks ready to apply the prescribed treatment.  
 
In this paper, we will consider the extent to which reforms in Spain and Italy have followed the 
patterns predicted by political economists studying institutional change.1 One of these predicted 
patterns is evolutionary. In these cases, slow shifts in underlying interests give rise to new 
coalitions favoring significant reforms, the adaptation of existing institutions to new functions or 
their simple abandonment. An alternative path to change emerges when exogenous shocks force 
a rapid—and often radical—revision of prior institutional settlements. The Euro crisis would 
seem to be a classic case of the latter.  
 
Most readers will be familiar with at least the broad contours of recent labor market reforms in 
Southern Europe. On the conventional reading, privileged insiders in Spain long resistant to the 
imposition of more market-conforming labor market rules were finally vanquished by the 
technocrats advising the Troika. In other words, the exogenous shocks of the crisis undermined 
the power of the coalitions defending existing institutions and paved the way for a logic of 
economic efficiency to supplant the logic of politics that underpinned previous settlements. The 
same conventional wisdom would hold that a similar logic applies in Italy, where the same 
pressures have been rather less successful in forcing change, largely because of the well-known 
roadblocks to reform in Italy’s fragmented and veto-ridden political system. 
 
In this paper, we will challenge the conventional view that these reforms reflect the 
straightforward application of a neoliberal, deregulatory recipe in the interests of greater labor 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 For an overview of these debates, see Mahoney, J. and Thelen, K. (eds.) (2010a). Explaining 
Institutional Change: Ambiguity, Agency, and Power. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
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market efficiency. We will argue that this interpretation is doubly flawed. In the first instance, 
the logic of the labor market reforms pursued in Spain and Italy has been far more political than 
economic. Second, even as massive changes have been taken place in the regulation of the 
Spanish labor market,  the reforms left intact critical features of the prior institutions in ways that 
have not been sufficiently appreciated—in other words, change has been far more incremental 
than revolutionary, even in the face of extraordinary exogenous shocks. In Italy, recent reforms 
have also left much of the existing regime in place. 
  
Our interpretation of recent reforms in Southern Europe suggests the limits of recent work in the 
historical institutionalist tradition. Kathleen Thelen has described three patterns of responses to 
changing organization of interests in capitalism, which she describes as deregulation, dualization 
and embedded flexibilization.2 Embedded flexibilization (the archetypical Scandinavian outcome 
in which liberalization of labor markets is compensated by a social investment strategy to 
minimize exclusion) results where previous policy trajectories generate well-organized interests 
outside of manufacturing. Supported and guided by powerful states with strong programmatic 
preferences, organized workers and employers outside of manufacturing provide support for a 
recasting of labor market rules and supply side institutions. Some scholars have argued that the 
institutional outcomes of this process should provide a model for Spain.3 However, the historical 
trajectory of interests and institutions in Southern Europe looks nothing like anywhere in 
Scandinavia, making this outcome exceedingly implausible. 
 
The other two patterns described by Thelen, however, may more credibly serve as potential 
models for making sense of recent labor market reforms in Spain. Deregulation is said to emerge 
where exogenous shocks—e.g., the decline of industrial manufacturing—undermine unions’ 
market power and employers from declining and rising sectors join together to demand the 
individualization of risks (ever-fewer collective and individual job protections and steady 
reduction in levels of social service protection). Dualization, on the other hand results where 
evolutionary changes in economic organization gradually reduce the power of organized interests 
in manufacturing, thus providing the space for emergent service sectors and smaller industrial 
firms to press for liberalization on the margins of the labor market and the welfare state. In the 
dualization model, institutional veto points and the political strength of labour market insiders 
determine the choice to force adjustment onto labour market outsiders. 
 
Southern European labor markets have long been described as highly dualized;4 indeed, the 
Troika, the European Commission and the European Central Bank, as well as most orthodox 
economists, have stressed that reducing the division between labor market insiders and outsiders 
is one of the central challenges countries like Spain and Italy must address. If embedded 
flexibilization rests on a series of organizational and institutional prerequisites that are sorely 
lacking in Southern Europe, then the exogenous shock of the crisis should generate shifts toward 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Thelen, Kathleen. 2014. Varieties of Liberalization and the New Politics of Social Solidarityi 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 
3 Such solutions have been proposed by both Vicenç Navarro and Victor Lapuente. We are of course 
aware of the considerable differences in their respective understandings of the political and economic 
problems facing Spain and the plausability of the solutions proposed. 
4 Inter alia, see Rueda, David. 2007. Social Democracy Inside Out: Government Partisanship, Insiers and 
Outsiders in Industrialized Democracies (Oxford: Oxford University Press). 
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one or another of these two outcomes. This claim generates two alternative hypotheses. If the 
exogenous shock sufficiently weakens the domestic coalition that has long supported dualization, 
then we would labor market reforms to move Spain in a decisively deregulationist direction. 
Alternatively, if, despite the stresses posed by the demands of powerful external actors, the long-
standing domestic, cross-class coalition defending insider labor market privileges holds together, 
dualization would be expected to increase.  
 
Our analysis will show that neither of these hypotheses is adequate to the task of understanding 
the direction of labor market reform in Southern Europe since the onset of the crisis. The central 
problem with historical institutionalist approaches with respect to the Southern European cases is 
not their concern with specifying collective interests and defining the mechanisms through which 
coalitions emerge around specific programs of action; this is, obviously the substance of politics. 
However, the conception of interests in the historical institutionalist literature is largely limited 
to material interests in the political economy.5 As we shall see, the interests that have informed 
labor market reforms in Spain, particularly since the PP’s electoral victory in November 2001, 
have been narrowly partisan and political. Obviously, certain segments of society, and 
particularly certain groups of actors within the labor market, have been particularly advantaged 
or disadvantaged by these reforms. However, these consequences are largely secondary to the 
more naked partisan interests being pursued.  
 
In Italy, the labour market reform passed by the Monti government reflected the less obviously 
partisan backing for deregulation. The lack of a cohesive parliamentary majority around the 
Monti executive, and Monti’s own technocratic background which undermined his political 
authority, the more limited scope of the Italian reform can also be interpreted in the light of the 
different political opportunities facing party politicians. Both the major Italian electoral 
coalitions have mixed incentives in the politics of labour reform, since they both represent 
sectors of Italy’s industrial and financial business communities, and the trade union movement’s 
partisan alignment is less clear than in Spain. The relatively slower pace of labour reform in Italy 
is also, we contend, a function of the rather different preferences of industrial employers, 
deriving from the presence of a much larger sector of competitive manufacturing than in Spain 
and a much stronger presence of these firms in the peak employer association, Confindustria. 
Employers in this sector are far less enthusiastic about labour market deregulation, given the 
greater importance of skills and access to patient capital for their profitability. 
 
The following analysis suggests that studies of institutional change need to move beyond narrow 
adscription of insider and outsider status to employee interests, and take more seriously the 
competitive strategies of employers, and the relations between employers’ interests and political 
parties. We suggest that the aggressive employer offensive in Spain was made possible by the 
close political connections between the employers’ associations (notably CEOE) and the PP, 
which facilitated a partisan strategy of deregulation that served both political and economic ends. 
In Italy employers have a much more varied set of economic interests and political connections 
which undermined joint action to push the deregulation agenda. These political relationships, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 We are not accusing scholars in this tradition of being crude materialists. Indeed, one of their most 
important contributions to political economy has been to clarify the ways in which material interests are 
constructed through socialization processes mediated by institutions. Our point, rather, is that in the end, 
the interests that are privileged in this literature are largely economic rather than political. 
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much more than the different nature of labour representation or formal political institutions, 
account for the different outcomes in the two cases. 
 
But there is a further area where the Southern European cases suggest a modification of the 
prevailing theoretical approaches in the political economy of structural reforms. The labour 
reform agenda in the South has focused on the formal legal framework of employment law, 
especially relating to dismissals, contracting types and collective bargaining. The reasons for this 
are clear enough: both Spain and Italy have long traditions of highly regulated labour relations, 
and some of the institutions that economists and international institutions have objected to most 
strenuously are entrenched in codified law. But the ways in which these laws are implemented 
appear to confound many of the objectives of reformers. Most notably, a higher legalistic 
approach to employment relations has created a set of stakeholders that fall outside most political 
economists’ focus of attention: the various legal advisors and intermediaries that help workers, 
unions and employers manage employment relations, and the legal practioners who apply the 
law, for example in labour tribunals. These actors also play an important role in the process 
which has rarely been considered by scholarly observers, and indeed to some extent by policy 
makers themselves. 
 
The following pages represent a first cut at developing these ideas in the framework of a 
comparison between Spain and Italy. The Spanish case is presented in rather more depth at this 
stage, the Italy case is briefly sketched out at the end of the paper. 
 
 
Spanish Labor Market Reforms 
 
The process of labor market reform in Spain has been dictated by the concerns of domestic elites 
eager to ensure that the internal devaluation demanded by the Troika would be largely borne by 
the popular classes rather than capital. Unwilling or unable to leave the Euro or impose losses on 
the largest banks and their investors, Spanish governments of both the Left (under José Luis 
Rodríguez Zapatero) and the Right (under Mariano Rajoy) have slashed public spending and 
pursued labor market reforms. As unemployment skyrocketed to more than 25% and both 
demand and credit dried up, many employers suffered along with their employees. For those 
employers who survive the crisis, the long-term costs of the crisis are likely to be few. For vast 
swathes of the working population and the unions and parties that seek to mobilize their support, 
however, the crisis may well linger for many years to come. 
 
Many welfare state experts warn that indiscriminate cutbacks in health and education are likely 
to leave deep, permanent scars on institutions that were built with enormous public investments 
in the years since the transition to democracy.6 Similarly, experts in pensions argue that changes 
recently put in place to ensure the “sustainability” of the system imply such significant cuts in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Bosch, Xavier, Pedro Moreno, and Alfonso López-Soto. 2014. The Painful Effects of the Financial 
Crisis on Spanish Health Care, International Journal of Health Services, 44:1; Del Pozo Sen, Alberto and 
José Moisés Martín Carretero. 2013 (December). “Social Cohesion and the State in Times of Austerity. 
Country Case: Spain,” Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/id/10453.pdf; Legido-
Quigley, Helena, et al. 2013 (June 13). Will Austerity Cuts Dismantle the Spanish Health System? BMJ, 
346. 
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many Spaniards’ eventual retirement benefits that the entire system has in fact been 
transformed.7 Nevertheless, although they reflect long-standing debates about the appropriate 
public-private mix in welfare state provision, these reforms do not appear to be guided by a clear 
impetus to transform the underlying logic of welfare state institutions. The same cannot be said 
for labor market reforms. 
 
Labor market reforms in Spain—particularly since Rajoy’s conservative Popular Party won an 
absolute majority in the November 2011 elections—have been informed by the desire to 
transform radically the balance of power between capital and labor. In January 2012, the 
Financial Times asked Luis de Guindos, the Economy and Competitiveness Minister for the new 
government, where growth and employment would come from. He responded, “[l]abour reform 
and the financial sector, the banking industry. So the central point of the labour reform has to be 
modification of the system of collective bargaining in Spain.”8 De Guindos claimed that the new 
government would be careful to avoid “…[contaminating] the sovereign risk with the banking 
risk.” Of course, the treasury was to become highly contaminated. With respect to labor market 
reforms, however, de Guindos was true to his word. In February 2012, the government approved 
Law 3/2012, the most significant labor market reform since the Transition to democracy. 
 
The legal and regulatory changes pursued by the PP have entailed a shift in the locus of 
authority, that is, the right to exercise discretion. Where discretionary authority in the labor 
market was previously exercised both by employers and by labor market intermediaries (unions, 
employer associations, judges and the Labor Authority), the reforms put in place by the PP have 
decisively shifted discretion over labor market outcomes towards employers. These changes 
reflect a move away from a socialized conception of the firm and the economy towards one in 
which the owners of capital are understood to be, effectively, the only legitimate voices 
determining whether and how labor is deployed.  
 
This drive to shift the locus of authority in the Spanish labor market is fundamentally a political 
project, in two senses. First, the political space in which these reforms were pursued was created 
by extraordinary conjunctural circumstances. Demands for internal devaluations by European 
financial elites generated the political leverage needed to drive through aggressive labor market 
reforms long resisted by unions and their political allies, the labor bureaucracy (labor courts, the 
Labor Inspectorate, and the Labor Authority), and even certain employers largely satisfied with 
the previous status quo.9 Second, the character of labor market reform has been determined by 
primarily political rather than economic considerations: to undermine and recast the existing 
status quo in order to impose the (neo-liberal) authority of the marketplace. 
 
The remainder of this section details the process through which these changes were put in place 
in the service of Spanish economic, and political, elites.10 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Suárez Corujo, Borja. 2013. ¿El factor de sostenibilidad: caballo de Troya del sistema pública de 
pensiones? Tema Laborales 121: 13-35. 
8 Mallet, Victor. “FT Interview Transcript: Luis de Guindos.” 5 January 2012, FT.com.  
9 This complex alliance is described in Dubin, Kenneth A. “Adjusting to the Law: The Role of Beliefs in 
Firms’ Responses to Regulation,” 2012, Politics &Society 40:3; 386-421. 
10 While the regulatory changes put in place by the PP have been justified by governing elites in economic 
efficiency terms, their economic benefits have been murky, at best; by contrast, their political 
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A. Not the Same Old Story 
 
On 10 February 2012, the newly arrived government of Mariano Rajoy took advantage of the 
Popular Party’s (PP) absolute majority to pass the Royal Decree Law 3/2012, provoking a 
general strike and effectively neutralizing much of the agreement to reform collective bargaining 
reached just two weeks earlier by the social partners. On 29 July 2014, some two and a half years 
later, the main social partners and the Minister of Employment and Social Security, Fátima 
Bañez, reached an “Agreement of Proposals for Tripartite Negotiations to Strengthen Economic 
Growth and Employment.”11 Was this simply another case of the long-standing Spanish pattern 
of pacts followed by conflicts followed by more pacts, with little more than a few legislative 
changes in between promoting greater precariousness for those on the margins of the labor 
market?12 
 
The accord, unsigned and announced days before the August recess, making it unlikely to garner 
much parliamentary attention in the fall, declares that tripartite negotiations (in some cases 
involving the regional governments) will be opened to address dualism in the labor market, to 
update the vocational and on-going professional training system, and to consider possible 
measures to address situations where no one in a household holds a job. It also declares that 
unions and employers will redouble their efforts to map the structure of collective bargaining and 
identify the number of firms and workers affected by non-application clauses in situations of 
hardship and to strengthen mechanisms that favor internal flexibility over layoffs and the 
extrajudicial solution of conflicts. 
 
Why did the government and social partners return to the bargaining table? From the 
government’s perspective, recent economic and political developments provided incentives to 
demonstrate a consensual approach to economic and social policymaking. The agreement took 
place against the backdrop of increasingly confident expressions of incipient economic recovery 
by the government and the conclusion of the IMF Mission to Spain.13 However, with 
unemployment still near 25% and recriminations echoing after the PP’s poor performance in the 
May 2014 European Parliament elections,14 it was certainly politically expedient to reach an 
agreement claiming to assist those most hurt in the crisis, especially with municipal and thirteen 
regional elections upcoming in May 2015 and general elections being required by the end of 
2015.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
advantages—disorganizing and repressing workers and their allied supporters—are quite clear. One may 
be forgiven for suspecting that the Troika’s labor market prescriptions have been embraced so 
enthusiastically for just this reason. 
11 “Acuerdo de propuestas para la negociación tripartita para fortelecer el crecimiento económico y el 
empleo” Accessed at http://prensa.empleo.gob.es/WebPrensa/noticias/ministro/detalle/2277 on 8 August 
2014. 
12 See for example, Hamann, Kerstin. 2012. The Politics of Industrial Relations: Labor Unions in Spain 
(New York: Routledge) 
13 IMF. 27 May 2014. “Spain: 2014 Article IV Consultation Concluding Statement of the Mission,” 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/ms/2014/052714.htm.  
14 The PP won the 2009 EP elections with 6.67 million votes and 24 seats. In 2014, with abstention 
virtually unchanged from 2009, they received just 4.07 million votes and 16 seats, two more than the 
Socialists. Far Left parties increased their total number of seats from 3 to 15. 
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For the unions, participation in an unsigned accord filled with promises to negotiate and devoid 
of any real content regarding the collective regulation of employment relations was largely a sign 
of defeat. The government’s offensive against labor—through legislation, through the courts and 
through executive action—is largely complete. Encouraged by the Troika and enabled through 
its absolute majority in Parliament, the PP has not only pursued internal devaluation through 
salary restraint but also transformed labor relations through legal centralization and 
juridification. These reforms have generated a massive reallocation of power towards managers 
and a profound restructuring of the labor relations system. The unions’ return to the negotiating 
table with the government is largely a sign of their near-total powerlessness to defend workers’ 
interests in any other realm; anything but the same old story. 
 
B. Transforming Labor Relations Through Legal Centralization: The PP’s 2012 Reform 
 
Law 3/2012 significantly reduced the costs and legal uncertainties surrounding layoffs and 
expanded employer authority in three fundamental ways: by lengthening the trial period for new 
hires to an entire year, by expanding the scope of employer discretion in the workplace, and by 
permitting the unilateral rejection of existing collective bargaining agreements. These changes 
have favored salary reductions and weakened unions’ representative capacity.  
 
Employers can now introduce permanent downward changes in salaries previously agreed 
through collective bargaining or individual negotiations for demonstrable reasons related to the 
firm’s economic, technical, organizational or production needs.15 If the changes affect multiple 
workers and are accepted by the workers’ representatives (works council, firm-level union 
section or ad hoc worker committee), the agreement can only be overturned by the courts in 
cases of fraud, bribery, or a civil rights violation. If no agreement is reached after a 15-day 
consultation period, the employer may proceed with the changes unilaterally following one 
week’s notice, although in such cases the employer’s justification and willingness to bargain in 
good faith can be reviewed by the Courts.  
 
 A comparison with the Socialists’ 2011 reform of the same statute is instructive. The Zapatero 
government sought to encourage firms to adjust through internal flexibility measures rather than 
layoffs by adding new language stipulating that the “economic” needs justifying the proposed 
changes could include not only the short-term financial survival of the firm (as the Courts had 
previously interpreted this passage) but also the firm’s competitive position. The Socialists’ 
stipulated that disagreements between employers and worker representatives be referred to 
sectoral bipartisan committees and, if necessary, to arbitration procedures defined by the social 
partners. Under the new language, the sectoral bargaining unit can only be consulted when the 
changes are collective and, if the sectoral unit cannot agree on a solution, the employer or the 
workers may solicit binding arbitration. Thus, only an arbitrator or a judge can stop an employer 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Previously, firms could only reduce salaries established in sectoral agreements when they could 
demonstrate a persistent decline in revenues. The reductions could only be temporary and the agreement 
with the workers’ local representatives would have to include a plan for reestablishing the sectoral rates. 
Where no local agreement could be reached, the committee representing the sectoral bargaining 
representatives could approve or reject the proposed reduction, with subsequent appeals to arbitration 
possible. Article 82 Workers Statute (ET) (2011 text). 
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from unilaterally and irrevocably revising salaries (or any other aspect of internal flexibility 
covered by Article 41).16 
 
The revision of Article 41 has transformed the relationship between sectoral bargaining agents 
and workplace actors by dramatically increasing employers’ capacity to deviate from sectoral 
agreements. The 2012 reform also revolutionized the dynamics of collective bargaining at the 
sectoral level by reducing unions’ bargaining power and by opening the door to a substantial 
reduction in traditionally high rates of collective bargaining coverage. Prior to 2012, collective 
bargaining dynamics were shaped by two critical legal norms, ultraactividad and extension. 
Ultraactividad meant that any clause in an agreement would remain in force unless both sides 
agreed to its renegotiation. If the application period of an agreement were to conclude without a 
new contract, the old contract would remain in force. Extension meant that sectoral agreements 
were automatically applied to all firms within the sectoral and geographical range of the 
bargaining unit.17 Employer representatives at the sectoral level seeking to engage in concession 
bargaining regarding wages (or virtually any other contract clause) thus faced a Herculean task: 
unions had little to fear from simply refusing to make concessions.18  
 
The 2012 reform upended this equilibrium. Extension rules were revised so that firms are now 
permitted to negotiate their own collective bargaining agreements with clauses deviating down, 
as well as up, from those established at the sectoral level with respect to salaries, hours, job 
categories, contracting and work/life balance.19 The 2012 reform also places important limits on 
ultraactividad (Article 86 ET). If either party denounces a collective bargaining agreement, it 
loses validity one year after its specified termination date. From that moment on, the most 
proximate, collective bargaining agreement at a level above that of the denounced agreement 
(provincial, Autonomous Community or statewide) enters into force. Should there be no superior 
agreement, employment relations would then be regulated by the Workers’ Statute. The 
minimum salary in this latter case would now be the state-set minimum of €645.30 per month.20  
 
Limiting ultraactividad has revolutionized collective bargaining in Spain. Employers with firm-
level agreements more generous than sectoral agreements can now engage in concession 
bargaining by threatening to denounce the agreement. Sectoral bargaining agents can now raise 
the prospect of collective bargaining coverage disappearing entirely for entire sectors. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Article 41.4 ET and article 82 ET. 
17 This explains why traditional coverage rates in Spain have averaged around 80% even though union 
density has long been less than 20%, Critically, prior to the 2011 reform, firm-level agreements could 
only improve on the conditions set out in the relevant sectoral agreement. Hence with rare exceptions, 
firm-level agreements were only negotiated at the insistence of worker representatives. 
18 In reality, these bargaining rules are probably at least as important as the differential in dismissal costs 
between permanent and temporary contracts in explaining Spain’s historically high rates of precarious 
unemployment. Unions negotiated on behalf of insiders and employers in turn sought flexibility on the 
margins. 
19 The 2011 reform (Article 84 ET) opened the door for firm-level agreements that set different standards 
for these questions. However, it allowed sectoral bargaining units to restrict these opt-outs, something 
now prohibited with the 2012 reform. 
20 With 14 monthly payments. Notice that this is far below the lowest salary typically set in a collective 
bargaining agreement, even in sectors with many low-skill positions. 
Draft, not for quotation or citation without permission. 
	   9	  
C. A Cheaper Labor Market or a Better One? The Goals of the 2012 Reform 
 
The Troika, the OECD and the Bank of Spain continue to press the Spanish government for 
further labor market reforms. Their recommendations center around a small number of proposals 
intended to address long-standing problems related to duality in the Spanish labor market and 
significant obstacles to intermediation and labor mobility. Specifically, the critics suggest: (1) 
further reductions of severance pay for permanent contracts to reduce the still slight gap that 
exists in this regard with respect to temporary contracts (at least for firms with 50 or more 
employees); (2) lengthening the trial period (with no severance pay during the trial period) for 
new employees in larger firms to match the full year accorded to firms with fewer than 50 
employees; (3) eliminating temporary contracts all together by creating a single contract category 
with gradually ascending severance; (4) increasing investments in active labor market policies.21 
 
These recommendations dovetail with those long advocated by orthodox labor economists in 
Spain.22 However, the Spanish government does not seem inclined to follow this advice. Mariano 
Rajoy and the Minister of Employment and Social Security (MEySS), Fátima Bañez, have 
repeatedly stressed that the government is largely satisfied with the 2012 reform and that it does 
not plan any further major changes.23 The government’s position, we contend, reflects the fact 
that it does not share the objectives of those advocating more thoroughgoing neo-liberal reforms.  
 
In introducing its recommendations, the OECD states that “Whether or not the 2012 labour 
reform is sufficient to transform the Spanish labour market into one that combines flexibility 
with fairness and worker security remains to be seen.”24 Similarly, Christine Largarde, Managing 
Director of the IMF, said in recent comments on the Spanish adjustment program that labor 
market reforms must continue: “Both firms and their workers need to be assured that they can 
reach appropriate agreements on working conditions and wages.”25 Whether or not the reader—
or the Troika—believes that the steps these actors have proposed will lead to economic recovery 
or restore social solidarity, these are nevertheless the values orienting the policy prescriptions of 
“serious” people in positions of authority. They are not, however, the values orienting the 
Spanish government’s reform agenda.  
 
Luis de Guindos recently made clear that wage reductions were the cornerstone of his 
government’s strategy for economic recovery. After ridiculing the Zapatero government’s efforts 
to pursue countercyclical, “Keynesian” fiscal solutions, he laid out the current government’s 
approach: 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 For all, see OECD. 2013 (December).The 2012 Labour Market Reform in Spain: A Preliminary 
Assessment (Paris: OECD). www.oecd.org.  
22 Various Authors.2009 (April). “A proposal to restart the Spanish labor market,” 
http://www.crisis09.es/PDF/restart-the-labor-market.pdf. 
23 As the Minister stated, “The reform is done; the government is only considering minor adjustments.” El 
gobierno sólo se plantea ajustes menores a la reforma laboral,” 2 August 2013, Elpais.com 
24 OECD, op. cit., 46. 
25 Comments delivered at the conference, Europe—The Path to Sustainable Economic Growth, Bilbao, 
Spain, 3 March 2014. Available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2014/030314.htm.  
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In the case of Spain we gained competitiveness in the past through the devaluation of the 
peseta…Now we have gained competitiveness through internal devaluation, through 
outperforming our peers in terms of the evolution of labor unit costs. And without any 
sort of second round or side effects...This is going to be different because it is more 
sustainable…To flexibilize labor markets is something we have to do…It’s how we’re 
going to grow in the medium term. [our emphasis]26 
 
While outside observers stress—at least rhetorically—the importance of balancing labor market 
competitiveness with equity concerns, the main architect of Spain’s economic strategy has made 
it clear that for his government, cheaper is better. Yet, when one considers the full range of 
measures pursued by the PP with respect to the labor market, it appears that this is not the 
complete story. Internal devaluation is not merely a requirement imposed by the Troika; it is also 
an opportunity to transform the distributional dynamics of the labor market and, perhaps, the 
structure of political contestation. For the Popular party, the primary flaw with the prior 
framework of labor market regulations appears to have been the possibilities it provided for 
collective action, not the inequalities occasioned by its contracting rules. The path the 
government has chosen to drive down wages is a direct challenge to the regulating—and the 
mobilizing—capacities of Spanish unions. 
 
A similar argument can be made regarding the government’s apparent reluctance to eliminate the 
labor market’s dual structure. Spanish unions have often been accused of defending insiders, i.e., 
workers with permanent contracts and considerable tenure at the expense of new hires and those 
with temporary contracts.27 Spanish governments’ historic reluctance to address this duality has 
long been attributed to union resistance; however, given the ferocity of their offensive against 
collective rights, it’s hard to believe that the PP feared antagonizing the unions on this particular 
issue. Rather, we are forced to conclude that the PP chose to maintain the dualistic character of 
the Spanish labor market because it was convenient for capital (providing a docile and low cost 
army in a context of labor abundance) and politically expedient to encourage divisions within the 
working classes. 
 
D. The Evidence: Winner Take All Dynamics in the Spanish Labor Market 
 
The evolution of collective bargaining 
 
A November 2013 survey of more than 200 larger firms (81.3% > 50 employees) offers 
important details regarding the impact of the February 2012 labor market reform on firms’ 
employment and labor relations practices.28 Employers reported that they were taking advantage 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Comments of Luis de Guindos at the OECD seminar: The Euro Area at a crossroads. Brussels, 17 
February 2014. http://video.consilium.europa.eu/webcast.aspx?ticket=775-982-14001. The minister’s 
comments begin at precisely the 1 hour point.  
27 Dolado, Juan José et al. 2010. ¿Quiénes son los insiders en España? in Dolado and Florentino 
Felgueroso, eds., Propuesta para la reactivación laboral en España (FEDEA) 
http://www.crisis09.es/PDF/Propuesta_reactivacion_laboral.pdf. 
28 The sample is far from representative of Spanish employers, which are overwhelmingly very small 
firms. However, the questions are far more detailed than those in any statistically significant survey. 
Fundación Sagardoy and Fundación Adecco. 2013.3er observatorio de seguimiento de la reforma laboral 
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of the reform to reduce staff with lower severance, reduce wages and hours and withdraw from 
sectoral collective bargaining agreements. Approximately 43% of the firms had laid workers off 
over the last year and more than 20% had taken advantage of new procedures to promote internal 
flexibility and escape clauses from in-force agreements to reduce wages. The average salary 
reduction was approximately 10%. 
 
Approximately 11% of the firms had opted out of collective bargaining clauses regulating 
salaries (86%) and working hours (43%). Of those firms whose collective relations were 
regulated by a sectoral-level agreement, 27% of large firms and all of the firms with less than 50 
employees had begun or were planning to open negotiations for a firm-level contract.29  
 
To what extent are these trends borne out by the government’s data? Unfortunately, data 
regarding collective bargaining is still provisional for the entire period since the 2012, as the 
government has reduced reporting of collective bargaining agreements to those registered 
electronically (claiming that it would be saving some €400,000) and eliminated the Labor Market 
Survey (Encuesta de Coyuntura Laboral), which provided the most extensive data available on 
the evolution of internal flexibility.30  
 
The results of this opacity can be seen in the following data on year to year salary increases in 
collective bargaining agreements.31 Columns 2, 6 and 10 report the definitive salary increases for 
each year for, respectively, all agreements, firm-level agreements and sectoral agreements. 
Columns 3, 7, and 11 report the number of agreements in each category and columns 4, 8 and 12 
the number of workers affected by those agreements. The effects of the crisis can be seen clearly 
in the declining number of workers affected after 2008. However, we do not know how much of 
the sharp decline in coverage rates between 2012 and 2013 is a reflection of reporting problems 
and how much is a reflection of employers taking advantage of the 2012 reform to withdraw 
from agreements. What is clear is that the nominal salary changes reported reflect a real decline 
in wages—internal devaluation is indeed underway.  
 
Table 1: Collective Bargaining Coverage and Annual Salary Change by Level 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
de 2012. Club de Excelencia en Sostenibilidad. http://www.adecco.es/_data/NotasPrensa/pdf/540.pdf. 
Last accessed 20 August 2014. 
29 In the first edition of the survey shortly after the reform, 40% of large firms but none of the smaller 
ones were planning to negotiate their own agreements. In the second survey in early 2013, already 60% of 
small firms were considering this possibility. The results suggest a rapid learning curve for larger firms 
and a slower one regarding the opportunities created by the reform. 
30 Bentolila, Samuel. 9 April 2013. Apagón estadístico. http://www.fedeablogs.net/economia/?p=29745.  
31 Ministry of Employment and Social Security. July 2014. Resumen de resultados. Estadística de 
convenios colectivos de trabajo. Monthly advance through June 2014. Available at 
http://www.empleo.gob.es/estadisticas/cct/welcome.htm.  
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Union publications confirm the widespread downward trend in wages. As the CC.OO. union 
reports in its July 2014 collective bargaining update, “…the unions and workers have prioritized 
the preservation of their collective bargaining agreements, accepting multi-year renovations, but 
at a high cost in salary devaluation and a reduction of other benefits and conditions, sometimes 
in exchange for employment guarantees, but without sufficient compensation in most cases.”32 
 
The ministry also reports 748 cases of opt-outs from collective agreements from March – Dec 
2012, 2,512 during 2013 and 1,532 through June 2014, affecting respectively 29,352, 159,550 
and 50,232 workers.33 98% of the opt-outs reported were agreed during the consultation period: 
in a context of high unemployment and reduced severance pay, workers and their representatives 
are rarely willing to contest employers’ demands. Where workplace representation is weak, such 
agreements are more likely to go unreported, and may even be informal. The non-representative 
data reported at the beginning of this section suggests that opt-outs are far more frequent than 
those recorded in the government’s incomplete data.  
 
This claim is supported by the unions’ efforts to collect data from their members and through 
their visits to firms without union representatives.34 CC.OO. notes that in the 29 months since the 
reform was approved, almost 1200 new company-level collective bargaining agreements were 
created, whereas prior to the reform there were typically some 200-250 per year. The union’s 
survey suggests that much of this increase comes in small, service-sector firms: contracts 
initiated by employers and signed by worker representatives unconnected to unions with salaries 
and conditions far below those in the once-binding relevant sectoral agreements. Not only is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Secretaría de Acción Sindical de CC.OO. 2014 (July). La negociación colectiva tras dos de reforma 
laboral. Confederación Sindical de CC.OO., p. 7; Secretaría de Acción Sindical - UGT. 2014 (February). 
Dos años de reforma laboral. UGT. 2014 (April – June). Boletín de negocición colectiva 18. 
http://www.ugt.es/actualidad/2014/julio/boletin18_UGT_negociacioncoletiva.pdf.  
33 Ministry of Employment and Social Security. July 2014, op. cit. 
34 Secretaría de Acción Sindical de CC.OO. 2014 (July), op. cit. 
Draft, not for quotation or citation without permission. 
	   13	  
collective bargaining coverage declining, but we must also increasingly question the value for 
workers of bargaining coverage itself.  
 
It is thus hardly surprising that the government might prefer to obscure from view the extent to 
which the 2012 reform has disorganized employment relations. 
 
E. The Path to Internal Devaluation: Recasting, or Un-casting, the Spanish Labor Relations 
System 
 
With an absolute majority ensuring passage of any legislation it desired in the Parliament, the 
PP’s efforts to reconstruct the Spanish labor market faced three major obstacles: constitutional 
and procedural objections from recalcitrant judges and labor inspectors, collective action in the 
firm, and broader unrest in the streets. Over the two years since Law 3/2012 was passed, the 
government has taken significant actions to safeguard its reforms on all three fronts.  
 
Taking on the Judiciary 
 
On multiple occasions since the law’s passage, judges have rejected collective layoffs, workplace 
reorganizations and salary reductions for lack of cause or for failure to follow precedent,35 
leading to frequent complaints by employers and their representatives.36 Various elements of the 
reform were also challenged in the Constitutional Court, precisely on the grounds that they called 
into question the established model of labor and social relations balancing the constitutionally 
protected freedoms of employers to manage with those of workers to effective representation and 
a decent standard of living. 
 
On 16 July 2014, the Constitutional Court upheld three critical aspects of the 2012 reform, 
rejecting claims of unconstitutionality put forward by the parliament of the region of Navarre. 
The decision was met with an energetic dissent from Fernando Valdés Del-Ré, one of Spain’s 
foremost progressive labor law scholars, joined by two other members of the court.37 Despite the 
dissent, the government had reason to confide in the Constitutional Court’s support. In June 
2013, the government took advantage of a partial renovation of the Court to create a conservative 
majority (7-5) for the first time in a decade. The new President of the Court, Francisco Pérez-
Cobos, had been a member of the PP since 2007. He was also the author, along with his then 
senior clerk, Javier Thibault Aranda, of a 2010 article in one of Spain’s most prestigious labor 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Pascual, Raquel. 21 May 2014. “Así han interpretado los jueces la reforma laboral,” 
http://cincodias.com/cincodias/2014/05/20/economia/1400594782_780723.html. According to the 
President of CEOE, Joan Rosell, “Many more labor reforms are needed to adapt the reality of the law to 
the reality of the firm in order to not be waiting to see what the judges say.” 
36 Iñigo Sagardoy, Managing Partner, Sagardoy Abogados. “Algunos tribunales están desvirtuando la 
reforma laboral," n/a. 12 May 2014. Orhttp://www.expansion.com/2014/05/12/juridico/1399916581.html. 
See also, Valverde, M. and M.Serraller. 6 April 2014. “El desafío de los tribunales a la reforma laboral,” 
http://www.expansion.com/2014/04/06/economia/1396814060.html.  
37 As individual votes are not reported, we do not know whether the two “progressive” judges whose 
names do not appear in the dissenting opinion voted with the majority or simply chose not to subscribe 
the arguments of the dissent. 
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law journals proposing major changes in the regulation of collective bargaining.38 When the PP 
took power, Thibault Aranda was named Director General of Employment in the MEySS and 
was a central figure in the drafting the new law, which adopted virtually whole cloth the changes 
he and Pérez-Cobos had proposed in their article.39 
 
The ruling confirmed the reform’s inversion of the prevalence of sectoral collective bargaining 
agreements over firm-level agreements and the right of either party to request arbitration in a 
collective dispute regarding opt-outs from an in-force contract. It also declared constitutional the 
one-year trial period permitted under the highly subsidized “support for entrepreneurs” (apoyo a 
los emprendedores) contract category, which allows firms with less than 50 employees to 
dismiss new workers without severance (or cause) during their first year. Together with its 
important reductions in severance pay and the elimination of ultraactividad—an issue recently 
settled by the Supreme Court—, these issues represent the most significant changes introduced 
by the 2012 reform.  
 
As in the case of the Constitutional Court, the government had good reason to expect that the 
Supreme Court would consolidate doctrine regarding the reform in ways consistent with the 
legislator’s intentions. The Justice Ministry’s 2013 reform of the General Council for Judicial 
Power (Consejo General del Poder Judicial), the formally self-governing body overseeing the 
Courts, imposed simple majority voting for Council decisions instead of the previously required 
qualified majorities. As a consequence, the conservative majority of the Council was able to 
impose a conservative majority on the Supreme Court.40  
 
According to the reform’s critics in the judiciary, these changes undermine fundamental 
constitutional guarantees and shift the balance of power between employers and workers. In a 
country where the vast majority of firms have less than 25 workers, the ability of employers to 
negotiate firm-level agreements effectively marginalizes large numbers of workers from union 
protections as employers pressure local, non-union representatives to sign agreements that offer 
conditions inferior to those offered at the sectoral level. As the dissenting opinion argues: “the 
objective is not an articulated decentralization of collective bargaining but rather, more crudely, 
a disaggregated and atomized decentralization.”41  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Pérez de los Cobos y Orihuel and Francisco Javier Thibault Aranda. 2010. “La reforma de la 
negociación colectiva,” Relaciones laborales: Revista crítica de teoría y práctica, 2; 1189-1200. 
39 Díez, Luis. 19 July 2013. “El presidente del TC y militante del PP inspiró con un letrado amigo la 
reforma laboral de Rajoy,” http://www.cuartopoder.es/laespumadeldia/2013/07/19/el-presidente-del-tc-y-
militante-del-pp-inspiro-con-un-letrado-amigo-la-reforma-laboral-de-rajoy/; 12 June 2013. “Los 12 
magistrados del Tribunal Constitucional,” http://www.rtve.es/noticias/20130612/12-magistrados-del-
tribunal-constitucional/684980.shtml.  
40 Over the five years of its current mandate, the Council’s majority will name half the judges on the 
Supreme Court and the presidents of all the regional appeals courts (Tribunales Superiores de Justicia) 
without having to compromise with other factions. Íñiguez, Diego. 11 December 2013. “Regreso al siglo 
XIX,” http://elpais.com/elpais/2013/12/05/opinion/1386257293_269314.html.  
41 “…la finalidad no es lograr una articulada descentralización contractual sino, más rudamente, una 
descentralización disgregada y atomizada.” “Voto particular que formula el Magistrado don Fernando 
Valdés Dal-Ré a la Sentencia dictada en el recurso de inconstitucionalidad núm. 5603-2012,” §II.C.4(c). 
http://www.tribunalconstitucional.es/es/salaPrensa/Documents/NP_2014_059/2012-05603VPS.pdf 
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Progressive jurists criticize the right to request binding arbitration to enforce opt-outs from 
collective bargaining agreements as a similarly unconstitutional intervention in the rights of 
unions and employer associations to regulate their affairs. The central point of contention is the 
State’s participation in the National and Regional Collective Bargaining Commissions that 
choose the arbitrators. For the majority, the government’s constitutional obligation to “defend 
productivity” (CE 38) justifies both the radical decentralization of collective bargaining and the 
State’s involvement in the obligatory arbitration of collective disputes.42 For the dissenters, the 
economic exigencies of the moment cannot justify the effective annulment of workers’ 
constitutional rights to collective bargaining (CE 37) or the right of unions and employer 
associations to manage their own affairs (CE 8).43  
 
Using a similar logic, the dissenters argue that a trial period of a year for all types of jobs, no 
matter how short the learning curve fails to meet the test of proportionality between the business 
needs of employers and the citizen’s right to a decent job and protection against unfair dismissal. 
Ultimately, unions and progressive students of the Spanish labor market fear that the one-year 
trial period is little more than a government strategy to reclassify what are in many cases 
temporary jobs as permanent ones. Given the generous subsidies offered to employers who hire 
under this contract modality, there is surely more than a grain of truth to this argument. 
 
In sum, the Constitutional Court’s decision goes a long way toward reducing lingering 
uncertainties about the new model of labor relations contained in the 2012 reform. To the extent 
that the divide between insiders and outsiders in the labor market has been reduced, such 
reductions have come via big cuts in severance costs for permanent workers. Nevertheless, 
precarious contracting, whether recognized as temporary or disguised through subsidized, 
permanent contracts of various kinds, will continue to plague the Spanish labor market going 
forward. The central point for our argument, however, is that the reform has reduced the costs of 
redeploying or dismissing labor market insiders to such an extent that the prime beneficiaries of 
dualism at this point are not a particular class of workers but rather employers and their political 
allies. 
 
The Court’s decision also provides judicial support for a government committed to minimizing 
the impact of collective regulation on employer decisions. The reforms introduced in the 
structure and content of collective bargaining Law 3/2012 were clearly intended to neutralize 
unions’ abilities to resist employer initiatives and to promote internal devaluation through a 
reduction in salaries and layoff costs. The labor market reform was only one plank in a broader 
offensive to reduce the power of any and all labor market intermediaries (unions, employer 
associations, labor inspectors, judges and, as we shall see, ordinary citizens) to condition 
employer discretion. Labor market reforms, at least in Spain, have increased the marketization of 
policymaking (more discretion for employers) while at the same time reducing the de jure or de 
facto discretionary authority and political power of labor market intermediaries.  
 
The Constitutional Court’s decision is most appropriately read in this light: it accepts the central 
tenets of a reform that decisively reduces the capacity of the courts to second-guess employer 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 STC 5603-2012, de 16 de julio de 2014. 
http://www.tribunalconstitucional.es/es/salaPrensa/Documents/NP_2014_059/2012-05603STC.pdf. 
43 Voto Particular, passim. 
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decisions. Confident that the Constitutional Court would accept a more limited role in labor 
market governance, the government simultaneously pursued other actions intended to neutralize 
potential sources of resistance to a winner-take-all labor market. In the following sections, we 
will detail two of the most important of these initiatives: severe restrictions on the capacity of the 
labor inspection service and legal and administrative changes that represent a direct threat to the 
right to strike and, indeed, the capacity to mobilize political protest in general.  
 
Taming the Labor Inspection Service 
 
The Labor Inspection Corps traditionally played a central role in the negotiation of collective 
dismissals. Inspectors would review documentation shared by the negotiating parties, require 
employers to produce further documentation, and emit reports evaluating the adequacy of the 
documentation provided and the degree to which the parties had bargained in good faith. In many 
cases, inspectors served as mediators to facilitate agreements and worked with the parties to 
identify alternatives to dismissals.44 
 
After the 2012 reform, the Director General of the Inspection Service (a civil servant appointed 
by the Minister of Employment and Social Security) sent out new instructions to Inspectors 
regarding their role in collective dismissals.45 Operational Criteria (OC) 92 (28 November 2012) 
limits the role of the inspectors in collective dismissals to procedural oversight and reminds 
inspectors that their recommendations are no longer obligatory. Inspectors are to refrain from 
requesting complementary documentation once the period of consultation (15 days) is concluded, 
and in no case should they evaluate whether the causes motivating the dismissal are sufficient. 
 
Going forward, only the judiciary would be able to evaluate the substance of employers’ claims 
regarding the causes motivating dismissal or work reorganization. This transformation of the 
Inspection Service’s role introduces a potentially radical shift in the balance of power between 
employers and worker representatives. Given the relatively small size of most Spanish firms and 
the limited resources of worker representatives, the Inspector’s traditional role substantively 
increased guarantees for the protection of workers’ rights. 
 
Labor market observers differ over the wisdom of Law 3/2012’s rebalancing of the interests of 
employers and workers for firms in difficulty and, particularly, the amplification and clarification 
of the range of justifications for changes in conditions or dismissals. Nevertheless, the law 
clearly upholds the formal (and for most employment law scholars, constitutionally mandated) 
requirement that changes be justified. It is here that we can appreciate the real significance of OC 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 For more on the role of the Spanish Inspection Service, see Dubin, Kenneth A. et al. 2012, “La 
Inspección del Trabajo: Un activo infrautilizado en la lucha contra el desempleo, [Labor Inspection: An 
Underutilized Asset in the Battle Against Unemployment],” in Toni Ferrer and Santos Ruesga, eds., 
Objetivo el Trabajo. Anuario de Relaciones Laborales 2012 [Objective Work. Annual Review of Labour 
Relations 2012] (Madrid: UGT, Marcial Pons), 175-178. 
45 The following discussion is based on a summary of “Criterio operativo núm. 92 sobre la actuación de la 
Inspección de Trabajo y Seguridad Social en los procedimientos de despido colectivo y de suspensión de 
contrato y reducción de jornada,” 28 November 2012, offered by Eduardo Rojo Torrecilla. The 
authenticity of his discussion as been confirmed with two currently Inspectors. 
http://www.eduardorojotorrecilla.es/2012/12/sobre-las-causas-alegadas-en-un.html. 
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92: it makes it far less likely that workers will dispute employers’ causal claims, even when they 
would be unlikely to stand up to judicial scrutiny.46  
 
Undermining collective resistance 
 
Proponents of labor market deregulation have long criticized Spanish unions for opposing the 
development of legislation regulating the right to strike, as called for in Art. 28 of the 
Constitution.47 Indeed, with the sole exception of the last absolute majority Socialist government 
in 1993, no Spanish government of the democratic era has managed to put forward legislation 
regulating the right to strike as called for in the Constitution.48 Nevertheless, strikes can be 
limited by the declaration of minimum service levels for “essential” services offered by the 
public sector (or private firms contracted by the State), particularly those related to health, 
security, transport, education or sanitation, as well as those related to private sector minimal 
maintenance requirements.  
 
The definition of minimum service standards has been the object of intensive jurisprudence for 
years. After a bitter 2013 strike provoked by layoffs and other changes in the sanitation services 
provided by private contractors in Madrid, Rajoy announced that he had asked the MEySS to 
study a possible regulation of minimal services to ensure that minimums would in practice be 
upheld.49 This call for a minimum services law was embraced by employers’ associations but 
rejected by the unions. The union’s resistance to such a law is understandable: in practice, courts 
have repeatedly found governments at all levels guilty of setting “abusive” minimal standards, 
although these decisions generally come after the fact and bring no further sanction. Given the 
current government’s proximity to employers, the unions fear that a strike law will legalize 
minimum service levels that have previously been labeled abusive by the courts, which are 
currently left to make sense of vague statutory language.50 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 For example, in a decision reached on 21 April 2014, the Supreme Court rejected a minority union’s 
challenge of a lower court decision to approve a collective dismissal negotiated between the employer and 
a majority of workers’ representatives. In its ruling, the lower court noted that alternative measures such 
as salary reductions or working time reductions may well have made the dismissals unnecessary, but with 
Law 3/2012 and an agreement in hand, the judiciary had no reason to intervene. The historic role of the 
Labor Inspection Corps might well have obviated this outcome. “La importancia del acuerdo durante el 
periodo de consultas,” 3 July 2014. http://www.eduardorojotorrecilla.es/2014/07/la-importancia-del-
acuerdo-durante-el.html. Accessed 14 August 2014. 
47 Durán López, Federico. 19 May 2014. “Los conflictos sociales y el imperio de la ley,” 
http://cincodias.com/cincodias/2014/05/16/economia/1400256935_565444.html.  
48 That initiative, pacted with the two majority unions, died when the government called early elections. 
The subsequent minority Socialist government did not revive the proposal. 
http://www.rtve.es/noticias/20131123/servicios-minimos/799501.shtml.  
49 21 November 2013. “Rajoy encarga a Empleo que estudie ‘una ley de servicios mínimos, para que se 
cumplan,’" http://www.rtve.es/noticias/20131121/rajoy-encarga-empleo-estudie-ley-servicios-minimos-
para-se-cumplan/798122.shtml. 
50 In fact, Title II, art. 17.1 b (the section on transportation, no employment law!) of the 4 July 2014 
omnibus bill authorizes the Ministry of Fomento to set minimum service standards for airports. Rojo 
Torrecilla, Eduardo. 8 July 2014. Estudio del contenido laboral del Real Decreto-Ley 8/2014, de 4 de 
julio, ¿una ley de acompañamieto encubierta? (II). www.eduardorojotorrecilla.es. Accessed 14 August 
2014.  
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The possible regulation of higher minimum standards is not the only threat to the effectiveness of 
the strike as a weapon of collective conflict. Since the PP came to power, an unprecedented 
number of strikers have been pursued for both administrative and criminal violations. The unions 
CC.OO. and UGT recently issues a joint report documenting some 81 cases being pursued 
against strikers affecting at least 261 workers. At least 40 workers face the very real prospect of 
going to jail, although none of the cases involve serious acts of violence.51 As the unions and 
several jurists point out, the criminal penalties sought for unionists contrast sharply with the 
prosecutorial forbearance revealed by the total absence of criminal penalties for even the most 
brazen anti-union practices pursued by employers, even though both kinds of violations are 
classified under the same statute.52 Similarly, Spanish prosecutors’ recent criminal cases against 
bankers have, unlike those against strikers, included requests for less than two years of jail time, 
which means probation for those with no criminal record.53 The unions have denounced the 
sudden aggressiveness of national and regional prosecutors before the International Labor 
Association, the European Committee for Social Rights, as well as the parliament.54 They have 
also received letters of support for their campaign from the progressive associations of judges 
and labor inspectors.55  
 
The government has also taken steps to restrict any and all forms of public protest that might serve to 
raise broader awareness of perceived instances of political and economic injustice and serve as building 
blocks for opposition both within and beyond the Parliament. In November, 2013, the Ministry of the 
Interior distributed a draft proposal of its new Law for Citizen Security. As part of the legislative 
review process, the document was evaluated by the General Council for Judicial Power and the 
analogous body overseeing the prosecutor’s office, the Prosecutorial Council (Consejo Fiscal); both 
were extremely critical with the draft for granting the police excessive discretional authority in the face 
of public protests and for threatening constitutional protections of citizens charge with violating the 
law.56  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 CC.OO. and UGT. 2014. “Ofensiva penal contra el derecho de huelga,” 
http://www.ugt.es/actualidad/2014/junio/CCOO%20UGT%20OFENSIVA%20PENAL%20CONTRA%2
0EL%20DERECHO%20DE%20HUELGA.pdf  
52 Penal Code Article 315. Requena Aguilar, Ana. 6 July 2014. Doble rasero judicial: penas de cárcel a 
piquetes, sanciones al patrón que no deja hacer huelga http://www.eldiario.es/economia/Penas-protestar-
sanciones-administrativas-empresas_0_267374097.html. 
53 Urruti, Mikel. 31 May 2014. “De los trabajos y las penas,” 
http://lanzuzenbidea.blogspot.com.es/2014/05/160de-los-trabajos-y-las-penas.html.  
54 For more details, see http://huelganoesdelito.es/huelganoesdelito/. 
55 Comunicado de Jueces para la Democracia sobre condenas de prisón para sindicalistas, 23 July 2014: 
http://www.juecesdemocracia.es/txtComunicados/2014/23julio14.htm. For the Inspectors, 9 July 2014. 
http://www.ccoo-servicios.es/huelga/html/31388.html.  
56 CGPJ: 
http://www.poderjudicial.es/cgpj/es/Poder_Judicial/Consejo_General_del_Poder_Judicial/Actividad_del_
CGPJ/Informes/Informe_al_Anteproyecto_de_Ley_Organica_de_Proteccion_de_la_Seguridad_Ciudadan
a; Consejo Fiscal: http://www.fiscal.es/Documentos/Documentos-del-Consejo-
Fiscal.html?pagename=PFiscal%2FPage%2FFGE_pintarDocumentos&cid=1242052647004&_charset_=
utf-
8&buscador=1&ckConsultas=1&txtFechaDesde=&txtFechaHasta=&txtPalClave=&btnBuscar2=Buscar; 
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On 11 July 2014, the Council of Ministers approved a revised version of its propose Law for 
Citizen Security.57 The new law doubles minimum fines and raises substantially the maximum 
financial penalties for violating norms governing public protest, with fines for minor violations 
ranging from €100-600 and for serious and very serious violations from €600 – 600,000. The 
range of sanctionable behaviors increases from 10-17 for minor violations and from 16-26 for 
serious ones. This increase is largely attributable to a reclassification of actions previously 
sanctioned in the criminal code as administrative violations. However, the new sanctions 
proposed are in most cases significantly higher than those in the criminal code. To compound the 
matter, the Ministry of Justice has introduced fees for access to the Administrative Courts, 
whereas access to the Criminal Courts is free.58 Moreover, in administrative matters, unlike 
criminal ones, police reports alone are sufficient evidence for a judge to confirm the sanction. 
 
These new restrictions follow on the heels of a considerably more belligerent attitude toward 
public protest, as the government’s own data for the last three years clearly demonstrates. The 
number of public meetings that failed to comply with the law increased slightly from 3,173 in 
2011 to 3,461 in 2012, the first year the PP was in office. However, the number of sanctions 
levied increased from 366 to 1,722. In 2012, the government was notified of 44,233 public 
protests and prohibited 294. In 2013, with virtually the same number of protest notifications 
(43,170), the number of protests prohibited increased to 1,682. Regarding protests specifically 
related to labor concerns, in 2012, there were 15,182, of which only 95 were prohibited; in 2013, 
with a similar number of protests (16,587), 815 were prohibited—almost 10 times as many. If we 
consider protests organized by unions, there were 88 prohibited in 2011, 77 in 2012 and 644 in 
2013, although in 2013 there were 95 fewer protests (18,600) than in 2012.59 
 
In sum, the PP’s 2012 labor market reform was only one element in a broader offensive against 
workers, organized labor and their allies that was made possible by the Troika’s insistence on 
recycling capital back to the core of the Eurozone through internal devaluation on the periphery. 
While some degree of wage devaluation was likely unavoidable without an exit from the Euro, 
the PP’s aggressive disorganization and repression of organized interests in the workplace 
through legislative reform, the muzzling of the State’s powers to restrict employer discretion, 
and prosecutorial aggressiveness towards dissenters (and forbearance for employers) went far 
beyond the demands of the Troika. At the same time, the PP has resisted demands for reforms 
not supportive of its broader project. Nevertheless, EU elites should be proud of the Spanish 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
the legislative proposal: http://www.juecesdemocracia.es/legislacion/Anteproyecto-de-Ley-de-Seguridad-
Ciudadana.pdf. All accessed 15 August 2014. 57
 Presno, Miguel Ángel. 19 July 2014. “El Proyecto de Ley Orgánica de Seguridad Ciudadana,” 
http://www.eldiario.es/agendapublica/nueva-politica/Proyecto-Ley-Organica-Seguridad-
Ciudadana_0_282771984.html. What follows is largely based on this summary, along with consultations 
with experts in criminal and administrative law. The increased policing powers in the new bill are less 
extensive than in the original version. 
58 Ley 10/2012, de 12 de noviembre. Fees for contesting the administrative sanctions set out in the new 
law will be as much as €2000 (excluding attorney fees). 
59 All data obtained from Ministry of the Interior, Anuario Estadístico, 2011, 2012, 2013. Available at 
http://www.interior.gob.es/es/web/archivos-y-documentacion/documentacion-y-publicaciones/anuarios-y-
estadisticas.  
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government for having understood that demands for internal devaluation were the ideal pretext 
for crafting a winner-take-all, neoliberal economy within the Periphery at the service of elites 
both at the Core and at home. 
 
Labour Market Reform in Italy: If At First You Don’t Succeed? 
∫ 
The Italian case at first blush appears to confirm much of the existing literature on structural 
reform, comparative political institutions, and labour market dualism. The implicit vetoes on 
structural reforms which have disappointed reformers and their supranational backers can be 
easily accommodated by a theoretical perspective that stresses the difficulties of overcoming 
conservative insider groups when dispersed and politically isolated outsiders fail to mobilize, 
particularly in a constitutional framework replete with veto points such as Italy. The limited 
scope of Monti’s 2012 reform60, and the so far hesitant moves made by current Prime Minister 
Renzi61, have been mostly interpreted as additional evidence of Italy’s reluctance to embrace 
fundamental change of any kind. 
 
This interpretation, popular in the media and political and policy debates, is heavily reliant on 
cliché and selective observation of the facts62. Italy has in fact undergone far-reaching reforms in 
vast areas of the economy, transforming the ‘sheltered economy’ of the pre-Maastricht era into a 
more open and liberally regulated market economy. Employment protection has converged with 
the European mainstream after a series of reforms liberalizing temporary and part-time 
employment, notably the Treu Package of 1997 and the Biagi Law of 2003. The much cited 
Article 18 (of the Labour Statute), which imposes reinstatement for wrongful dismissal, has yet 
to be abolished despite constant discussion ever since the early 2000s, but this rule applies to 
relatively few workers (companies under 15 employees, the vast majority of Italian firms, are 
exempt). In fact dismissals are not notably more difficult in Italy than in most other European 
countries63. Recent reforms have also significantly affected collective bargaining, with the move 
towards plant-level agreements in 2011. 
 
The crisis has not brought, however, the kind of full-scale assault on existing equilibria seen in 
Spain. One obvious explanation for this could lie in the absence of a sufficient parliamentary 
majority for such changes: whilst in Spain the crisis brought the collapse of Socialist support and 
hastened the election of a conservative government with a record majority, in Italy the 
fragmentation of the party system has prevented any government not led by Silvio Berlusconi 
from building a stable governing majority. Post-crisis attempts at reform have therefore been 
initiated by weak, largely technocratic administrations lacking a strong popular mandate. An 
electoral law that offers winning coalitions an automatic majority has not been sufficient to bring 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 Tito Boeri, “Desperately Seeking a Middleman’, Contemporary Italian Politics 5(2) (2013): 222-28.  
61 Gavin Jones, “Italy's modest labor reform shows Renzi's momentum faltering”, Reuters Thu May 15, 
2014. http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/15/us-italy-reform-renzi-idUSBREA4E0G020140515 
62 See Jonathan Hopkin “The Troubled South”, in Mark Blyth and Matthias Matthijs (eds.), Beyond the 
Euro (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming). 
63 Stefano Sacchi “Italy’s labour policy and policymaking in the crisis: from distributive coalitions to the 
shadow of hierarchy”, Labor Working Paper no. 132, 2013, p.14. 
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stability, since Italian bicameralism acts to counterbalance these artificial majorities. Not 
surprisingly one of the first reforms initiated by the Renzi government was the abolition of the 
Senate. 
 
But this approach fails to account for the accumulation of structural reforms implemented since 
the early 1990s, and in particular the major fiscal sacrifices made to join the euro. Italy actually 
showed abundant capacity to reform and its fiscal stance ever since the financial crisis of 1992 
has been extremely conservative by the standards of similar nations (Italy has run a primary 
budget surplus since 1994, even during the current recession). Moreover the structural reforms 
achieved by centre-left governments, particularly the first Prodi administration have had a 
counterpart in the changes imposed by the Berlusconi governments of the 2000s, such as several 
reforms of the justice system, regulation of media and communications, and education reforms. 
Although the economic efficiency gains resulting from these reforms is rightly questioned, what 
they reveal is that the roadblocks to policy change in Italy have been much exaggerated, and that 
when a cohesive coalition is constructed, major policy and institutional changes can be made. 
 
In this light we propose that Italy’s relatively slower pace of labour liberalization is best 
understood in terms of the nature of the reform coalition, and particularly the divisions within the 
employers’ sector and its complex relationships with the main political parties. Whereas in Spain 
the employers’ representation is in the hands of a Castile-centred elite closely associated with the 
currently ruling PP, with a strong influence from sheltered business sectors involved in close 
dealings with the state machinery, in Italy employers’ representation is less cohesive and reflects 
important divisions over policy. These divisions are in function of the stronger manufacturing 
sector in Italy, which is competitive in international markets and has a set of interests and 
preferences at loggerheads with the sheltered sector of domestically focused companies, very 
often SMEs (although Berlusconi’s Mediaset corporation is a good example of a domestically-
focused large company with little interest in global markets and heavy dependency on state 
regulation). The exposed sector functions according to the logics of Coordinated Market 
Economies, with requirements in skill formation and raising capital that favour a certain degree 
of state intervention to secure a skilled and stable workforce and provide a cushion against 
downturns. The sheltered sector has more of an interest in removing regulations that restrict 
downward pressure on wages and dismissals, along the lines of the Spanish model, and has little 
investment in CME-style institutions. 
 
These divisions are reflected in the relations between employers and the political parties. The 
centre-right parties, notably Berlusconi’s Pdl and the Northern League, have to a significant 
degree built their political support on the small business sector and on domestically-oriented 
large companies. During Berlusconi’s second government, the employers’ association 
Confindustria elected a leadership from the SME sector based in the South of the country, in a 
departure from the traditional pattern of large Northern firms (particularly FIAT) dominating the 
organization. However this new leadership, which favoured Berlusconi’s strategy of dividing 
labour by driving a wedge between the centrist CISL/UIL and the leftist CGIL over labour 
reform, did not survive long, and by 2006 the Northern industrialists around FIAT took control 
again, with Luca de Montezemolo of Ferrari becoming Confindustria president. At the same time 
Montezemolo made a rapprochement with the centre-left coalition led by Prodi, with some 
suggestions that he himself would enter politics. With the SME and sheltered sectors aligned 
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with the centre-right and the large exposed companies aligned with the centre-left, the 
employers’ front lacked any cohesive political representation, stymieing any attempt at radical 
labour reform. 
 
These divisions have persisted through the years of crisis. Confindustria has remained in the 
hands of Northern industrialists, whilst Berlusconi’s political coalition around the small business 
and sheltered sectors has maintained difficult relations with large companies. At the same time 
however, the centre-left PD has not proved a stable interlocutor for business, with its links with 
the CGIL proving a bone of contention. As a result, a new technocratic governing elite under 
Mario Monti, and subsequently the grand coalition administrations led by Letta and Renzi, has 
emerged to deal with the crisis, enjoying support from the European institutions and exposed 
sectors of Italian business. However lacking any cohesive parliamentary majority nor a clear 
mandate from employers, consensus around labour reform has proved elusive. The current 
scenario has involved a series of announcements of major changes – Renzi’s much hyped ‘Jobs 
Act’ – but little in the way of clear implemented change. At the time of writing, the outcome 
remains uncertain but the lack of a strong employers’ mandate and the weakness of the 
government makes a reform along the Spanish lines unlikely. 
 	  
Conclusion: Beyond Dualism 
 
Labor law reform has been used in Spain for political as much as economic policy ends. The 
conservatives of the PP focused and seized upon the legal reform of labor relations as a way of 
weakening, if not destroying, their most institutionally and economically potent political 
opponents. In the process, Spanish labor relations and employment law reform also reallocated 
power and discretionary authority within the national political economy. The Spanish labor 
reforms devolved discretionary authority, away from the Labor Authority perceived as pro-labor 
and even the courts, to the level of the firm and its managers. The reformed Spanish labor law 
granted managers—those with authority in the hierarchy of private firms—vastly broader 
discretion over employment decisions and participation in organized labor relations. The effect 
of labor law reform was to forcibly shift the collective, social, and solidaristic conception of the 
employment relationship to a neo-liberal individualistic and atomistic one through the imposition 
of a contractual and market-conforming legal framework.  
 
Italy has yet to follow this road. Although the pattern of liberalization at the margin and dualistic 
dynamics has been similar through the 1990s and early 2000s, the Eurozone crisis has played out 
rather differently. The lack of cohesive employer preferences over labour reform, and the 
political divisions between distinct industrial interests (ideological and territorial, as well as 
economic) has hindered the creation of a coalition for radical deregulatory reform, despite strong 
external pressures. That this has been the case is even more striking in the light of the major 
changes made in the Italian economy in the 1990s, under European external pressure, in order to 
participate in European Monetary Union. It suggests that politics, rather than a simple equation 
of external financial pressure applied to weak labour movements and clear employer preferences, 
lies behind labour market policy choices. 
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We tentatively conclude that this suggests that a more political, even partisan, conception of 
institutional change under crisis is required. Material interests may appear rather stable and crisis 
can indeed change the relative bargaining power of different interests and usher in major 
reforms. Financial crisis and the institutional constraints on national politics can also bring about 
major changes. But we argue that the institutional change literature has underplayed the role of 
partisan politics of the most traditional kind: political parties exploiting opportunities created by 
crisis to strengthen their electoral and organizational position by delivering policy favours to key 
constituent. The configuration of a strong party with a clear vision of policy which could benefit 
its main business stakeholders was present in Spain, but up to now has been absent in Italy. This 
partisan story, we argue, is an important addition and correction to the dominant accounts in the 
literature. 
 
 
 
 	  	  
